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I. INTRODUCTION
Federal Taxation is, of course, a creature of statute,' but so in-
genious have been man's efforts to deal with this particular statute
that a body of common law principles in the form of "judicial gloss"
has been engrafted onto the Code.2 Thus, for example, when a man
deals with related parties3 or with his alter ego, such as a wholly-owned
corporation, it is settled that the transaction must be cast in such a
* Member of the Editorial Board, University of Miami Law Review.
1. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954.
2. In this article all references to the Code, unless specified to the contrary or clearly
indicated in their context, will be used generically to embrace all federal income, estate,
and gift taxation statutes since the United States Congress instituted such taxing policies.
References to the Service will be used generically to include the government and the
Internal Revenue Service.
3. The concept of who are related parties varies depending on the substantive law
involved. Thus, under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 267(b), various relationships are
defined in applying the law, including the definition of a family as consisting only of the
brothers and sisters (whether by whole or half blood), spouse, ancestors, and lineal descen-
dants. In § 1563(e) (5), (6), however, the family members included for purposes of that
substantive provision are limited to the spouse, minor children, adult grandchildren, parents,
and grandparents.
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manner as if he were dealing "at arms length."4 In addition to man's
ingenuity, the very extent and complexity of the Code (especially the
more modern statutes) is such that ambiguity is inevitable. To confront
such ambiguity, the courts have created doctrines to be used for inter-
pretation of and testing standards for transactions in their tax setting.
Again, by way of example, a taxpayer on the cash basis is not taxed
until he has received payment.5 But to prevent abuse of this law, the doc-
trine of constructive receipt provides that a taxpayer may not avoid
taxation by refusing to receive payment if it is tendered, or capable of
being received but for his own desire not to receive it.8
One of the omnipresent judicial doctrines which has received much
attention by courts is the subject of this paper: step transactions. The
doctrine has been explained in numerous decisions, and in fact was
"developed as part of the broader tax concept that substance should
prevail over form." 7 It has been said, in speaking of multiple-step trans-
actions, that:
A given result at the end of a straight path is not made a differ-
ent result because reached by following a devious path.'
[W]e must regard matters of substance and not mere form.
[W]ithout regard to whether the result is imposition or relief
from taxation . . .closely related steps will not be separated
either at the instance of the taxpayer or the taxing authortiy.10
II. PRINCIPAL AREAS INVOLVED
It has been said that the step transaction doctrine "crops up at so
many points in the law of federal taxation as to defy summary .... ,,1
It is clear, however, that its principal application is in areas involving
tax-free transactions.
While there is nothing inherently wrong with multiple steps to
accomplish a result, a problem arises when the steps taken are used
to hide the true effect of the transaction. As the term implies, step
transactions relate to those cases where two or more transactions which
are independent in form are deemed to be so dependent in substance as
4. In Campana Corp. v. Harrison, 114 F.2d 400, 408 (7th Cir. 1940), an arms-length
transaction was defined as follows:
A sale at arm's length connotes a sale between parties with adverse economic
interests. To determine whether a sale between two corporations is at arm's length,
it is necessary to look at the stockholders behind the corporate structures.
5. INT. REV. CODE or 1954, § 446(c)(); Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(i) (1957).
6. United States v. Britt (5th Cir. 1964); Ross v. Commissioner, 169 F.2d 483 (Ist Cir.
1948) ; Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2 (a), T.D. 6723, 1964-1 Cum. BULL. 73.
7. American Potash & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 399 F.2d 194, 207 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
8. Minnesota Tea Co. v. Helvering, 302 U.S. 609, 613 (1938).
9. Weiss v. Stearn, 265 U.S. 242, 254 (1924).
10. Commissioner v. Ashland Oil & Ref. Co., 99 F.2d 588, 591 (6th Cir. 1938), cert.
denied, 306 U.S. 661 (1939).
11. B. BITTxER & J. EusTIcE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHARE-
HOLDERS 505 (2d ed. 1966).
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to require the tax consequences to be measured by viewing the overall
transaction from beginning to end without according any independent
significance to the steps in between.
Although the doctrine continues to be a major item of inquiry in
specific tax disputes, very little has been written or said about it as a
concept.12 Perhaps, as has been indicated, this is because it is so closely
akin to, if not subsumed by, the broader doctrine of substance versus
form." Or perhaps it is because the doctrine cannot, once stated, be ap-
plied carte blanche as some immutable tenet of construction, but must
be considered in the light of the varied facts of each case. The question
whether multiple steps will be integrated into one or the converse, whether
the whole of a transaction will be divided into its several elements, may
have to be answered against a background of the substantive area of
taxation in which a controversy arises.
III. TESTS IN APPLICATION
There have been several attempts to categorize "universal tests"
which can be utilized in analyzing step transaction cases. 14 But aside
from some broad generalizations and the synthesizing of certain jargon
which is useful in discussing the subject, it is apparent that no "universal
tests," independent of the substantive transaction, have been achieved
and probably none is practicable. Nevertheless, a review of those tests
which have been categorized seems a prerequisite to any further ex-
ploration of the step-transaction doctrine.
A. Time
One might think that whether transactions were separable or in-
divisible could be objectively inferred from the time relationship of
such transactions. Unfortunately, other considerations by the courts make
this element less of a guideline than might be hoped. Furthermore, the
facts of the cases under consideration inevitably differ and time, as a
measuring device in this instance, reacts accordingly. 5 Thus, two months
12. For earlier thorough discussions, See R. PAUL & P. ZIMET, SELECTED STUDIES IN FED.-
ERAL TAXATION 200-54 (2d series 1938); Mintz & Plumb, Step Transactions in Corporate
Reorganizations, 12 N.Y.U. INST. O N FED. TAx. 247 (1954), reprinted 1 TAX COUNSELOR'S
QUARTERLY 89 (1964); Gutkin, Step Transactions, 9 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED TAx. 1219 (1951).
13. Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945); Gregory v. Helvering,
293 U.S. 465 (1935); United States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156 (1921).
14. See note 12 supra. To test the step transaction doctrine against the facts of a case
has perplexed the courts that had early in the development of judicial doctrine (following
Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935), which established the principle that literal
compliance with the tax statutes was not sufficient to assure the tax consequences),
attempted to formulate some guiding standards. E.g., Scientific Instrument Co., 17 T.C. 1253
(1952), aff'd, 202 F.2d 155 (6th Cir. 1953) ; American Wire Fabrics Corp. 16 T.C. 607 (1951);
American Bantam Car Co., 11 T.C. 397 (1948), aff'd, 177 F.2d 512 (3d Cir. 1949), cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 920 (1950).
15. The court said in Turner Constr. Co. v. United States, 364 F.2d 525, 537 (2d Cir.
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have been held a determining factor in deciding that there was no reorga-
nization because the Congressional reports and the Service's regulations
suggested that acquisition of stock-for-stock in a "B" reorganization 6
should be accomplished over a relatively short period of time, such as
twelve months, and the acquisitions in the instant case were made in
two separate transactions over a fourteen-month period.17 Again, where
control was relinquished in two steps pursuant to a divisive reorganiza-
tion"8 by transferring 57 percent in 1961 and, twenty months later,
transferring the remaining 43 percent, it was held that although no time
limit is required by statute for relinquishing control 9
[i]t would be wholly inconsistent with [the premise of annual
tax accounting] to hold that the essential character of a trans-
action, and its tax impact, should remain not only undetermin-
able but unfixed for an indefinite and unlimited period in the
future, awaiting events that might or might not happen. This
requirement that the character of a transaction be determinable
does not mean that the entire divestiture must necessarily occur
within a single tax year. It does, however, mean that if one
transaction is to be characterized as a "first step" there must be
a binding commitment to take the later steps. °
Apparently, had there been a binding commitment to complete the series
of distributions within a reasonable time (or possibly even if future
distribution of control had been in the plan adopted by the stockholders),
the separate distributions would have been acceptable as if a total re-
linquishment of control had occurred in one event. Where, under proper
circumstances, a delay is explained, steps taken as much as six years
apart have been integrated.21 And, when found to be prearranged, steps
taken within hours have been integrated;22 but where not previously com-
1966), that "[t]he cases indicate that a substantial time lapse will lessen the likelihood that
independent transactions will be unified . . . but no case has placed a flat time limit on
the unified plan doctrine."
16. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 368(a) (1) (B) provides generally that no gain or loss will
result if stock is acquired solely for voting stock of the acquiring corporation, and the ac-
quiring corporation is in control (at least 80% ownership) of the acquired corporation im-
mediately thereafter.
17. American Potash & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 399 F.2d 194 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
18. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 368(a) (1) (D) provides, inter alia, that a transfer of an
active trade or business with a five-year history, to a new corporation in exchange for stock,
and the subsequent transfer of such stock to shareholders of the transferor, will not result
in gain or loss, if immediately after the transfer of the stock to the shareholders the trans-
feror corporation and the transferee corporation are still engaged in business.
19. See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 355(a)(1)(D).
20. Commissioner v. Gordon, 391 U.S. 83, 96 (1968).
21. Commissioner v. Ashland Oil & Ref. Co., 99 F.2d 588 (6th Cir. 1938), cert. denied,
306 U.S. 661 (1939); John G. Moffatt, 42 T.C. 558 (1964), af'd, 363 F.2d 262 (9th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1016 (1967); W. N. Fry, 5 T.C. 1058 (1945) (Delay caused by
regulatory agency); D. W. Douglas, 37 B.T.A. 1122 (1938).
22. Love v. Commissioner, 113 F.2d 236 (3d Cir. 1940).
1969]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXIV
mitted to a course of action, steps taken as little as a half hour apart
have been held independent.28
B. Intention
The avowed intention of the parties will, of course, be disregarded
if the facts controvert it. This is necessarily so since intention, being
subjective, is best measured by an objective analysis. Where intention is
in issue, reference to the result of the transaction is not an attempt to
downgrade the importance of the issue, but merely an attempt to properly
infer from the objective acts of the parties what the intention is. After all,
whether the parties intended their transaction to be taxable is not relevant,
but whether the parties intended to effect a certain result is relevant.24
As was said in Commissioner v. Ashland Oil and Refining Co.,
regardless of the form, the substantial result that was intended
to be effectuated, was a transfer of the ... properties ... [and]
... no taxable gain has been realized.25
In applying the test of the parties' intention, the general rule is to
give an intended result the same tax effect whether the result is accom-
plished directly or by circuitous steps.26 In this connection, most courts
have disregarded the stockholder's argument that for a corporate reor-
ganization there must be a corporate business purpose and therefore, for
example, since a liquidation-reincorporation is generally prompted by a
shareholder motive, the intervening step of liquidation should be accorded
the separateness of capital gains treatment and stepped-up basis given
assets transferred to the new corporation. But, as one court said,
the character of a reorganization . . . depends not upon the
motive of the stockholders but upon "what was done." . . . The
motive of the stockholders is immaterial, if a reorganization
of the corporate business is in fact accomplished....
[A] reorganization [occurs] when the series of un-
disputed transactions are considered as an integrated whole."
The tax result is the same whether a new corporation is found either
before or after liquidation of the old.28
In the early days of taxpayer planning, the courts sometimes dis-
regarded the obviously intended results and held the taxpayer to the exact
form of his transaction. Thus, in an attempt to engage in a tax-free
23 Henricksen v. Braicks, 137 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1943); Bruce v. Helvering, 76 F.2d
442 (D.C. Cir. 1935).
24. See Survaunt v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 753 (8th Cir. 1947).
25. 99 F.2d 588, 592 (6th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 661 (1939).
26. Minnesota Tea Co. v. Helvering, 302 U.S. 609 (1938).
27. Survaunt v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 753, 757, 759 (8th Cir. 1947).
28. Lewis v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1949).
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incorporation, the taxpayer was found instead to have engaged in a
taxable transaction when assets were transferred to the new corporation
in exchange for its check, which was immediately endorsed back to the
corporation.29 It is doubtful that this transaction would be taxable today.
Although inquiries into subjective intent are still pursued in certain
areas, "° it would appear that such inquiries are and should be made only
in the absence of sufficient extrinsic evidence from which to infer a
likely intent. And such intent as may be inferred will usually relate
back to that existing at the beginning of the road which led to the re-
sult.3
1
Admitting that there will be some circumstances where taxpayers'
intentions cannot be totally ignored, the exactness with which it can
be stated what in fact they -ultimately did is alluring as a test to deter-
mine how the tax incidence should fall. In other words, ignorance of
the tax law is no excuse. The desire of a taxpayer to characterize his
transactions as separate because this affords the best tax result is no
reason to expect adherence to such a desire or intent. It is naive to
believe that a taxpayer should be allowed to define his own terms to
avoid the reality of the event. It would seem that if the subjective intent
of the parties was totally disregarded wherever possible, more truth would
result in the decisions and more certainty would obtain in planning for
tax consequences.32
C. Interdependency
In American Bantam Car Co.,33 the court, citing Paul & Zimet,"4
said,
In determining whether a series of steps are to be treated
as a single indivisible transaction ... [an] important test is that
of mutual interdependence. Were the steps so interdependent
that the legal relations created by one transaction would have
been fruitless without a completion of the series?3"
29. Minnie C. Brackett, 19 B.T.A. 1154 (1930), aff'd sub nom. Estate of Brackett v.
Commissioner, 57 F.2d 1072 (7th Cir. 1931).
30. Griswold v. Commissioner, 400 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1968); American Potash & Chem.
Corp. v. United States, 399 F.2d 194 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
31. South Bay Corp. v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1965); Commissioner v.
Ashland Oil & Ref. Co., 99 F.2d 588 (6th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 661 (1939);
ACF-Brill Motors Co., 14 T.C. 263 (1950), aff'd, 189 F.2d 704 (3d Cir. 1951); Ericsson Screw
Mach. Prod. Co., 14 T.C. 757, 764 (1950).
32. And, of course, the results of the transaction, however reached, will be as binding
on the Service as on the taxpayer. Tennessee Ala. & Ga. Ry. v. Commissioner, 187 F.2d 826
(6th Cir. 1951); Buhl v. Kavanagh, 118 F.2d 315 (6th Cir. 1941).
33. 11 T.C. 397, (1948), aff'd, 177 F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 920
(1950).
34. R. PAUL & P. ZMET, SELECTED STuDIEs iN FEDERAL TAXATION 200-54 (2d series
1938).
35. 11 T.C. at 405.
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This is another attempt to find a satisfactory test for scrutinizing
transactions involving multiple steps. Its obvious merit is in its concern
with objective standards rather than the elusive subjective intention of
the parties. It is a test which was synthesized from some of the early
cases3 6 and adopted and furthered by many of the later cases."
Usually the interdependence test provides that if a step would not
have otherwise been taken, then the transaction will be considered in
its entirety and any other step will be integrated with the interdependent
step to determine the reality of the transaction. On the other hand, it
has been held that a mere intention without a requirement to act will
not cause a step to be integrated. 8 And, more recently, it was declared
that if there is no "binding commitment" to take a later step, such later
step may be segregated. '
D. Generally
As stated above, it is clear that the facts of the case as applied to
the substantive law in issue will dictate the road to follow in justifying
a court's decision. Although component steps of a single transaction can-
not be treated separately and, conversely, distinctly separate transactions
cannot be united for tax purposes,4" the court must still analyze the facts
in concluding that there are steps which should be combined or separated,
as the case may be.
There are many cases which appear to be at odds with one another
in the area of step transactions. It is submitted that this is the result of
different factual and evidentiary settings. For example, where trans-
actions are contingent or conditional upon other events, the transactions
and the contingent events will usually be inseparable. 4 On the other
36. Bassick v. Commissioner, 85 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1936); First Seattle Dexter Horton
Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 77 F.2d 45 (9th Cir. 1935); First Nat'l Bank, 34 B.T.A. 631
(1936).
37. Interdependent steps were not found, and hence integration not deemed necessary,
in National Bellas Hess, Inc., 20 T.C. 636 (1953), aff'd, 220 F.2d 415 (8th Cir. 1955) ; Scien-
tific Instrument Co., 17 T.C. 1253 (1952), aff'd per curiam, 202 F.2d 155 (6th Cir. 1953);
and American Bantam Car Co., 11 T.C. 397 (1948), aff'd, 177 F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1949),
cert. denied, 339 U.S. 920 (1950). But interdependent steps were found, and it was there-
fore held that separation of the steps would defeat the purpose of the undertaking and the
express intention of the parties, in American Wire Fabrics Corp., 16 T.C. 607 (1951). See
Prentis v. United States, 264 F.2d 525 (2d Cir. 1967) ; Turner Constr. Co. v. United States,
364 F.2d 525 (2d Cir. 1966) ; Roebling Sec. Corp. v. United States, 176 F. Supp. 844 (D.N.J.
1959); Sheppard v. United States, 361 F.2d 972, 980 n. 13 (Ct. CL. 1966); Baker Com-
modities, Inc., 48 T.C. 374, 401-07 (1967), aff'd, No. 23,019 (9th Cir., Aug. 8, 1969).
38. National Bellas Hess, Inc., 20 T.C. 636 (1953), aff'd, 220 F.2d 415 (8th Cir. 1955)
Scientific Instrument Co., 17 T.C. 1253 (1952), aff'd per curiam, 202 F.2d 155 (6th Cir. 1953)
American Bantam Car Co., 11 T.C. 397 (1948), aff'd, 177 F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1949), cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 920 (1950).
39. Commissioner v. Gordon, 391 U.S. 83 (1968).
40. Bassick v. Commissioner, 85 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1936).
41. Starr v. Commissioner, 82 F.2d 964 (4th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 680
(1936).
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hand, even where it was admitted that an entire transaction would not
have been consummated were certain other events not to materialize,
the separateness of the transactions has been recognized.42 Again, where
the parties, even absent precise programs to that effect, have an under-
standing of the steps to be taken in reaching the result desired, the
intervening steps will' often be taken as mere steps in the integrated
whole.43 However, in Portland Oil Co. v. Commissioner,44 the Court held
that this rule is not always workable, and that in certain cases trans-
actions will be held separate even though effected pursuant to a pre-
arranged agreement.
For further illustration, the same court has refused to integrate a
step which, although important to the parties, was not an indispensable
condition without which no other step would have been taken,4 5 but did
integrate a step into the overall transaction even though it was merely
"a contemplated possibility under the plan .... 1)46
With such uncertainty in the field of step transactions, taxpayers
may be advised to acquire "insurance," in the form of a Revenue Ruling
from the Service, before attempting any transaction involving a series
of steps. In this way, if a favorable ruling is not obtained, possibly the
transaction can be restructured, or at least the risks of litigation can
be better contemplated. In Revenue Ruling 58-93, 47 Corporation Y
transferred all its assets to a new subsidiary, Z, immediately prior to a
planned reorganization in which Y's assets (now comprised of Z stock)
were acquired in a statutory merger by another company, X. The ruling
held that, in substance, there was an acquisition of all of Y's assets
(prior to forming Z) by X and a subsequent transfer of such assets by
X to Z, the new subsidiary. In essence, the Service rearranged the timing
of the transaction. The important point is that since the reorganization
was planned at the outset, if the transactions were independently tested
under section 351,of the Code (dealing with tax-free incorporations)
they may have failed in that it could be said there was no control of the
new company by the transferor, Y, immediately after the transfer.4"
The "tests" set forth above are useful in their application to par-
ticular facts. But they cannot be relied on in all cases to "resolve the
question [of what] a set of steps [constitutes in fact] . . . . [This]
42. Helvering v. Tex-Penn Oil Co., 300 U.S. 481 (1937); American Potash & Chem.
Corp. v. United States, 399 F.2d 194 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
43. Baker Commodities, Inc., 48 T.C. 374 (1967), aff'd, No. 23,019 (9th Cir., Aug. 8,
1969).
44. 109 F.2d 479 (1st Cir. 1940).
45. ACF-Brill Motors Co., 14 T.C. 263 (1950), aff'd, 189 F.2d 704 (3d Cir. 1951).
46. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 40 B.T.A. 1100, 1106 (1939), aff'd, 115 F.2d 662 (8th Cir.
1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 699 (1941). But see National Bellas Hess, Inc., 20 T.C. 636
(1953), aff'd, 220 F.2d 415 (8th Cir. 1955), which allowed separateness of a step to which
the taxpayer was bound.
47. Rev. Rul. 58-93, 1958-1 Cum. BULL. 188.
48. See text relating to note 50, infra.
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determination is made by now classic standards for analyzing the overall
substance of transactions . .. .""
IV. PRACTICAL APPLICATION
Because step transactions can, theoretically, be found in any tax-
free or tax-preferential exchange setting, it would be impractical to at-
tempt an exhaustive summary of cases where the doctrine has been ap-
plied. But certain transactions have historically lent themselves to the
application more readily than others: incorporations, reorganizations,
liquidation-reincorporations, exchanges of "like-kind" property, and in-
direct purchases of assets. The practical application of the step-trans-
action doctrine in these areas will therefore be reviewed in this paper.
A. Incorporations
No gain or loss shall be recognized if property is transferred
to a corporation ... by one or more persons solely in exchange
for stock or securities in such corporation and immediately after
the exchange such person or persons are in control ... of the
corporation.5o
In determining whether this statute is met, the steps taken by the
parties will usually be considered from the standpoint of their substance.
Thus, except for some early "form over substance" cases, 51 the courts
will usually telescope the following steps into a tax-free incorporation:
(1) a corporation issues stock for cash, and (2) immediately exchanges
the cash for property of the new shareholder.12 And, extending the ob-
vious, where parties buy property for cash with the intention of conveying
to a corporation for stock, it has been held that the corporation acquires
the property for cash.5"
Taxpayers have often attempted to avoid the provisions of section
35151 (a mandatory provision) by intentionally failing to satisfy the
control requirement.5 5 The primary reason for this is to secure a step-
ped-up basis in the property transferred and either take a loss on the
exchange or limit gain to taxation under capital gains rates.
49. South Bay Corp. v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 698, 704 (2d Cir. 1965).
50. INT. Rav. CoDE OF 1954, § 351(a).
51. Minnie C. Brackett, 19 B.T.A. 1154 (1930), aff'd sub norm. Estate of Brackett v.
Commissioner, 57 F.2d 1072 (7th Cir. 1931).
52. E.g., A. C. Burton & Co. v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 115 (5th Cir. 1951); Walter S.
Heller, 2 T.C. 371 (1943), aff'd, 147 F.2d 376 (9th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 868
(1945).
53. Tulsa Tribune Co. v. Commissioner, 58 F.2d 937 (10th Cir. 1932).
54. Baker Commodities, Inc., 48 T.C. 374 (1967), aff'd, No. 23,019 (9th Cir., Aug. 8,
1969).
55. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 368(c), defines control for this purpose as being at least
80% of the voting power and at least 80% of the number of all other shares of stock
outstanding.
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On the other hand, to achieve carryover of desirable tax attributes,
or for other reasons, there are probably as many cases in which the tax-
free benefits of section 351 have been attempted although there was no
plan to use the newly formed corporation as anything but a stepping stone
to the true end sought."
The cases have been grouped under the varied situations wherein
(1) control after incorporation was voluntarily relinquished, (2) control
was relinquished pursuant to an obligation to do so, and (3) control was
lost as a result of another's exercise of an option to acquire stock. 7
It is in this area of "control" that the test of interdependence flourishes."
The question of "control immediately after" requires a two-fold
inquiry: (1) was compliance with the "immediate control" requisite met;
and (2) who is in control.
In the past, it has been held that mere momentary control after
the exchange was sufficient even though such control was shortly there-
after relinquished pursuant to a pre-existing plan or contract.5 9 This has
been the result even though at a transferor's request the stock is issued
in joint names.6" Furthermore, it has been held that, after the transfer,
the transferor may sell the stock received6 or the corporation may issue
more stock to others without affecting the immediate control require-
ment.62
These earlier cases have not, however, necessarily established a
certain result, for it has been said that:
[T]he interposition of new corporations of fleeting duration,
though the transactions were literally within the congressional
definition of . . . a nonrecognition section, would not avail in
the achievement of the tax avoidance purpose when it was only
a mask for a transaction which was essentially and substantively
... a taxable exchange."
In Manhattan Building Co.,"4 the issue of de-control following a
section 351 transfer was decided in the context of the text of inter-
dependence. Here the taxpayers, pursuant to a binding commitment
to turn over to underwriters a certain quantity of stock received in
the formation of a corporation, fell below the 80 percent ownership
requisite in complying with the statute. The court held that the second
step was an inseparable part of the entire transaction so that upon the
56. E.g., Electrical Sec. Corp. v. Commissioner, 92 F.2d 593 (2d Cir. 1937).
57. Mintz & Plumb, supra note 12.
58. See B. BITTxER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 11, at 89-94.
59. Portland Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 109 F.2d 479 (1st Cir. 1940).
60. P.A. Birren & Sons, Inc., 116 F.2d 718 (7th Cir. 1940).
61. American Compress & Warehouse Co. v. Bender, 70 F.2d 655 (5th Cir. 1934), cert.
denied, 293 U.S. 607 (1934).
62. National Bellas Hess, Inc., 20 T.C. 636 (1953), aff'd, 220 F.2d 415 (8th Cir. 1955).
63. Commissioner v. Morris Trust, 367 F.2d 794, 797 (4th Cir. 1966).
64. 27 T.C. 1032 (1957), acquiesced in 1957-2 Cum. BuIL. 5.
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transfer to the underwriters, it being part of the incorporation, the 80
percent control was lacking and the transaction was taxable.6 Manhattan
Building Co. follows the general rule that where a re-transfer of stock
received in incorporation is pursuant to a binding contract, the re-transfer
will be integrated with the initial transfer in determining whether there
is control by the transferor immediately after the transfer. 6
The question of tax-free formation of a new corporation often arises
in conjunction with a planned subsequent reorganization. Here, a new
corporation is formed with assets which are desired by another corpora-
tion (such assets representing some but not substantially all of the
forming corporation's assets). The incorporation meets the technical re-
quirements of section 351 in that there is ostensible control immediately
after the transfer of assets. Thereafter, the parent company exchanges
the new subsidiary's stock solely for voting stock of the corporation
desiring the assets,67 or the subsidiary exchanges its assets for voting
stock of the desiring corporation.6" Obviously, if the parent company had
instead of forming a new corporation with the assets wanted by the other
corporation, simply exchanged such assets for voting stock of the trans-
feree, it would be a taxable transaction since it would fail the "sub-
stantially all" test of section 368(a)(1)(C). This two-step to tax-free
success has been sanctioned in at least one case,69 but it is almost certainly
doomed to failure generally.0
In Electrical Securities Corp. v. Commissioner,7' the taxpayers owned
shares in a corporation, X, and the shares were desired by another cor-
poration which already owned some of X's shares. Even after acquisition
of the taxpayers' shares the acquiring corporation would not have control
of the corporation so that the transaction would have been taxable, i.e.,
would not have met the requirements of what is now Section 368(a) (1)
(B). To avoid this problem, the taxpayers formed a new corporation, Y,
by transferring their stockin X in exchange for all of Y's stock. Then,
as a part of the overall plan, the acquiring corporation acquired all of
the stock of Y in exchange for its own voting stock. Y was then liqui-
dated so that the acquiring corporation received the shares of X. The
court held that the intervening steps (including the incorporation) in
65. American Bantam Car Co., 11 T.C. 397 (1948), aff'd, 177 F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1949),
cert. denied, 339 U.S. 920 (1950), was distinguished on the ground that the underwriting
agreement in American Bantam was not a sine qua non in the general plan.
66. E.g., May Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 200 F.2d 852 (8th Cir. 1953).
67. Usually this would be a tax-free reorganization. See note 16 supra.
68. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 368(a) (1) (C), provides, generally, that no gain or loss
will result if substantially all of the assets of one corporation are acquired solely for voting
stock of the acquiring corporation.
69. Ballwood Co. v. Commissioner, 84 F.2d 733 (3d Cir. 1936).
70. Electrical Sec. Corp. v. Commissioner, 92 F.2d 593 (2d Cir. 1937) ; United Light &
Power Co., 38 B.T.A. 477 (1938), aff'd, 105 F.2d 866 (7th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S.
574 (1939).
71. 92 F.2d 593 (2d Cir. 1937).
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transferring the stock to the acquiring corporation must be ignored,
since the steps were so interrelated as to require that the tax effect be
measured by the substance achieved and not by the form of each step.
Where immediately after incorporation, others have options to ac-
quire enough shares to terminate control, the better view seems to be that
there is no loss of control until the option is exercised so that "control
immediately after" element is satisfied if the option is not exercised
immediately. 72 But some courts will find a violation of control if the
option is exercised within a few months or if its exercise is certain;
for example, because a nominal consideration is required for valuable
stock.73
Finally, in regard to the inquiry of immediate control and leading
to the inquiry of who is in control, it has been held that receipt of stock
by a transferor in an incorporation, followed immediately by a gift of
more than 20 percent of the transferee corporation's stock to members
of the donor's family, will meet the immediate control test. 4 Conversely,
in avoidance of section 351, a newly formed corporate taxpayer is al-
lowed a stepped-up basis in property received if in the transfer more
than 20 percent of the stock of the corporation was issued to a party
who was not a transferor.75
Since the question of control may involve more than one transferor,
the question of who is the transferor must be answered. This, in turn,
often involves complex fact patterns which create diverse results. Two
contrasting examples should sufficiently illustrate the problem here. In
Republic Steel Corporation v. United States,76 the parties planned to avoid
the 80 percent control requisite in order to get a stepped-up basis upon
incorporation. To effect the transaction the instigator, Republic Steel,
first bought shares of dissenting stockholders (11 percent) of Old Cor-
poration and contributed this stock to Old Corporation. Then New Cor-
poration was formed with the remaining old stockholders receiving less
than 80 percent. Not surprisingly, the Service asserted that Republic's
first step was part of the overall transaction which made Republic one
of the transferors, so that the 80 percent control test was met imme-
diately after the transfer. 77 However, the court held that the intervening
purchase of the minority shares was not a part of the transaction, and
the stepped-up basis was saved.7 8
72. National Bellas Hess, Inc., 20 T.C. 636 (1953), aff'd, 220 F.2d 415 (8th Cir. 1955).
73. See Barker v. United States, 200 F.2d 223 (9th Cir. 1952).
74. Wilgard Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 127 F.2d 514 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317
U.S. 655 (1942).
75. Fahs v. Florida Mach. & Foundry Co., 168 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1948). Since this is
pre-1954 case law, it is possible that today the transaction would be treated as a valid § 351
incorporation followed by a gift to the donee, subject to gift tax. See Treas. Reg. § 1.351-1
(b)(1) (1955).
76. 40 F. Supp. 1017 (Ct. CL. 1941).
77. Id. at 1021.
78. Id. at 1022.
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In the more recent case of Baker Commodities, Inc.,79 a contrary
result was reached. In this case, ten men formed a new corporation by
contributing $500 each. Three days later a partnership consisting of some
of the same ten men and another corporation exchanged certain property
with the new corporation for what was found by the court to be secu-
rities of the corporation. The court said,
The composition of the transferor group is dependent upon
whether the transfer of cash for stock by all 10 men and the
subsequent transfer of [property] by the . . . partnership and
[the other corporation] for [the securities] are to be viewed
as steps in a single transaction.A°
Relying on the test of interdependence and the belief that the trans-
action was pursuant to at least an orally manifested plan (as evidenced
from the objective results of the transaction), the court integrated the
transactions and denied a stepped-up basis to the property transferred.
B. Reorganizations
1. GENERALLY
In addition to generally satisfying the technical statutory require-
ments of a reorganization in order to receive tax-free treatment, there
must also be compliance with essential judicially created criteria. Thus,
there must be a business purpose,"' continuity of a business enterprise,8 2
and continuity of proprietary interest. 8 In many cases these doctrines
appear to be satisfied (or not, as the case may be) when viewing separate
steps of an overall plan. Therefore, the step-transaction doctrine is often
employed by the courts and the Service in analyzing an event to deter-
mine its tax consequences in the reorganization area. Reorganization,
in general, is not the subject of this paper, but some understanding of
applicable reorganization principles is necessary in order to understand
the application of the step-transaction doctrine. 4 In this regard, some
basic explanation of the contextual setting of the transaction will be
made as is deemed necessary for clarity.
Since much of what has already been said of the step transaction
is equally applicable in the reorganization area, it will suffice just to
79. 48 T.C. 374 (1967), aff'd, No. 23,019 (9th Cir., Aug. 8, 1969).
80. Id. at 405.
81. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). Note that a mere lack of tax avoidance
motives is not a sufficient substitute for business purpose. Commissioner v. Wilson, 353 F.2d
184 (9th Cir. 1966).
82. See Becker v. Commissioner, 221 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1955).
83. Le Tulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415 (1940); Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Com-
missioner, 287 U.S. 462 (1933). But cf. Helvering v. Alabama Asphaltic Limestone Co., 315
U.S. 179 (1942).
84. For an overall introduction to the area, see B. BiTsrr_ & J. EuvTE, supra note 11,
at 449-601; J. CHOMMIE, FEDERAL INCOmE TAXATION 492-525 (1968).
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remind the reader that in any context of a tax-free nature the true sub-
stance of the transaction as measured by its end result should be scruti-
nized. It would not serve any useful purpose to be repetitive in an attempt
to fully document the step-transaction doctrine in the reorganization area.
Unfortunately, there will be at least some inevitable overlap in discussion
here vis-4-vis what has previously been said and what will be said about
liquidation-reincorporations.
2. STOCK-FOR-STOCK
Included in the tax-free reorganization provisions is a transaction
whereby if a corporation acquires stock of another corporation solely
in exchange for its voting stock and is thereafter immediately in control
of such other corporation, then no gain or loss will be recognized ("B"
reorganization)., There are (or were) three major problem areas in
connection with this type of transaction: (1) where the stock used to
acquire control of the other company is not the stock of the acquiring
company; (2) where sufficient control is acquired solely for voting stock
and additional stock is acquired (prior to or after acquisition of control)
for other than voting stock; and (3) where stock is acquired solely
for voting stock over a period of time in a series of transactions ulti-
mately resulting in control ("creeping acquisition").
In Groman v. Commissioner" it was held that stockholders did
not have a continuing interest in the assets of their corporation when
they received, in addition to stock of the corporation involved in the
exchange, the stock of the parent of such corporation. In a companion
case17 the Court also held that where the stockholders' corporation ex-
changed its assets with a corporation solely for stock of such corporation,
and the corporation, as part of the same plan, immediately transferred
the assets to a subsidiary, the continuity of interest theory of Groman
was applicable since the parent corporation is not made a party to the
reorganization merely because the property or stock being exchanged
is passed through it, as a transitory step to the parent's subsidiary. But
where only unexpected events caused the parent to transfer stock
acquired in a "B" reorganization to its subsidiary, it was held that the
uncontemplated transfer did not revoke the parent's position as a party
to the reorganization."8
In the opposite type of arrangement where stock acquired in a "B"
reorganization was put in the acquiring parent's subsidiary for bona fide
business reasons and in accordance with its announced intentions and,
as soon as business permitted the parent liquidated the subsidiary thereby
acquiring the stock directly, it was held that the stock was always intended
85. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 368(a) (1) (B).
86. 302 U.S. 82 (1937).
87. Helvering v. Bashford, 302 U.S. 454 (1937).
88. Robert Campbell, 15 T.C. 312 (1950).
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to be owned by the parent so that the parent was considered a party
to the reorganization. The intervening ownership by the subsidiary was
therefore disregarded in the series of steps."9
The major problem in this area has been solved by statute, so that
at present stock of a parent company may be used to acquire stock or
assets of another company in a tax-free reorganization. °
The second problem in the "B" reorganization area is illustrated by
a case where the acquiring corporation obtains the 80-percent control
solely for voting stock, but goes on to acquire additional stock for other
than voting stock.91 Except in rare cases where complete separateness of
transactions can be found,92 mere separation in time or documentation
will not avoid the presumption that, in addition to voting stock, other
consideration was given in a unified plan to obtain the stock ultimately
acquired.
93
Finally, in the third problem area, there is some degree of uncer-
tainty today notwithstanding apparent statutory clarity. It is generally
agreed that if the 80-percent control requirement is met, even through a
series of complex steps all part of one integrated plan, a valid "B" reor-
ganization will result. 4 Prior to 1954, the statutory language was gen-
erally believed to require acquisition of at least 80 percent control in the
reorganization exchange itself. Therefore, if more than 20 percent of the
stock had been previously acquired, there could be no "B" reorganiza-
tion.9" Upon adoption of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code, this problem
was believed substantially solved when it was provided that it did not
matter whether the 80 percent control was acquired all at once or over a
period of time by a series of transactions. The only statutory requirement
is that the acquiring corporation be in control immediately after the ex-
change, whether or not it had control immediately before.' The regu-
lations 7 parroted back certain language relative to the modification of
this statute contained in the Congressional report to the effect that a
series of stock-for-stock exchanges will be aggregated to effect the 80-
89. Gertrude B. Chase, 44 B.T.A. 39 (1941), aff'd, 128 F.2d 740 (2d Cir. 1942).
90. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 368(a) (1) (B), (C), (D) and § 368 (b).
91. Hubert E. Howard, 24 T.C. 792 (1955), rev'd on other grounds, 238 F.2d 943 (7th
Cir. 1957).
92. See Commissioner v. Harris, 92 F.2d 374 (3d Cir. 1937) ; Bruce v. Helvering, 76 F.2d
442 (D.C. Cir. 1935); Helvering v. Ward, 79 F.2d 381 (8th Cir. 1935) ; Rev. Rul. 69-91,
1969 INT. REv. BULL. No. 9, at 12; Rev. Rul. 56-345, 1956-2 Cum. BULL. 206.
93. See Miller v. Commissioner, 103 F.2d 58 (6th Cir. 1939); Starr v. Commissioner,
82 F.2d 964 (4th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 680 (1936) ; First Seattle Dexter Horton
Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 77 F.2d 45 (9th Cir. 1935).
94. Barker v. United States, 200 F.2d 223 (9th Cir. 1952) [reversing itself, since its
original unreported opinion had overlooked the fact that under the law in force at the time,
there was no "solely voting stock" requirement, 52-1 U.S. Tax Cas. ff 9316 (9th Cir. 1952)).
95. Lutkins v. United States, 312 F.2d 803 (Ct. Cl. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 825
(1963).
96. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 368(a) (1) (B).
97. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(c) (1955).
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percent control if they occur "over a relatively short period of time such
as 12 months.198
The significance of this language may not have been fully appre-
ciated by some until the decisions in American Potash & Chemical Corp.
v. United States99 held that the 80-percent control must be acquired
within the 12-month period, or over a relatively short period of time
exceeding 12 months if the acquisitions are part of a continuing offer to
purchase.
3. STOCK-FOR-ASSETS
An alternative tax-free reorganization provides generally that no gain
or loss will result if substantially all of the assets of one corporation are
acquired solely for voting stock of the "purchasing" corporation.00 Here
again, the issue may arise as to whether additional consideration received
by the "selling" corporation was pursuant to the plan of reorganization
or was a separate transaction.10' In one case, B corporation acquired the
assets of A corporation by issuing B stock to A's shareholders and
$350,000 to A so that A could pay off its creditors. The $350,000 was
deducted from additional consideration to A's shareholders in exchange
for their leasehold interests. The Service maintained that the receipt of
cash was tied in with the receipt of B's stock, and therefore violated the
tax-free statute in force at the time. The court, however, held that the
receipt of the $350,000 was for a separate transaction, viz., the sale of
leasehold interests, so that the stock-for-assets exchange was tax-free,
even though the tax-free exchange was conditioned on the acquisition of
the leaseholds.10 2
It has been seen that a "creeping acquisition" in a "B" reorganiza-
tion is possible by virtue of statutory allowance. No similar allowance
exists in the case of "C" reorganizations due to the requirement that
substantially all of the assets of the "selling" corporation be acquired
solely for voting stock of the purchaser. Althongh there are many vari-
ations which could be employed to circumvent this restriction, °3 it never-
theless remains a "trap for the uninformed, a result which casts doubt on
the basic soundness of the [restriction] .11lO4 The principle is demonstrated
in the case of Bausch & Lomb Optical Co. v. Commissioner'"° where
the taxpayer, already the owner of 79 percent of the stock of a subsidiary,
issued its stock in exchange for the subsidiary's assets and then liqui-
dated, receiving back 79 percent of its stock issued. Apparently on the
98. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 273 (1954).
99. 402 F.2d 1000 (Ct. C1. 1968); 399 F.2d 194 (Ct. CI. 1968).
100. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 368(a)(1)(C).
101. However, it is now possible to acquire up to 20% of the assets for other than
voting stock. Id. § 368(a) (2) (B).
102. Helvering v. Tex-Penn Oil Co., 300 U.S. 481 (1937).
103. See B. BITTKER & J. EUsMcE, supra note 11, at 566-68.
104. Id. at 568.
105. 267 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 835 (1959).
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theory that, in fact, the assets had been acquired substantially by use of
the acquired company's own stock, the court found the various steps to
be a single plan having the effect of a taxable liquidation rather than a
tax-free "C" reorganization.
4. "B" REORGANIZATION CONVERTED TO "C" REORGANIZATION
In connection with the utilization by successor corporations of net
operating loss carryovers, a limitation is imposed by the Code." 6 This
is to the effect that, in the case of a "C" reorganization, to obtain full
benefit of the tax attribute the shareholders of the corporation possessing
the carryover must own, immediately after the reorganization, at least
20 percent of the fair market value of the outstanding stock of the ac-
quiring corporation. This restriction does not apply to acquisition under
the liquidating provisions of Code Sections 332 and 334(b) (1)."7 How-
ever, it should be noted that it is generally agreed that a series of trans-
actions
which purport to be a reorganization qualifying under section
368(a) (1) (B) followed by a liquidation qualifying under § 332,
but which in substance comprise a reorganization qualifying
under section 368(a)(1)(C), will be considered [as a "C"
reorganization for purpose of this statutory restriction]? °0
5. SPIN-OFFS AND UNWANTED ASSETS
It may frequently occur in business amalgamations that an acquir-
ing corporation is not interested in receiving certain of the assets of the
"selling" corporation. In these cases, taxpayers have frequently at-
tempted to dispose of such unwanted assets in a way which, if literally
interpreted, would provide them with preferential capital gain while they
still continue to operate the retained assets;10 9 or they have attempted
to pass these assets off as part of the non-taxable transaction.
In Helvering v. Elkhorn Coal Co.,"" prior to a stock-for-assets
transaction the "selling" corporation transferred 80 percent of its assets
to a new corporation in what it considered a tax-free incorporation, in
exchange for the new corporation's stock. The new stock was then dis-
tributed as a dividend in a tax-free spin-off."' The corporation there-
106. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 382.
107. Id. §§ 332, 334(b)(1). The sections provide that a parent corporation may liqui-
date its subsidiary and, in liquidation, receive the subsidiary's assets with the same basis as
they had to the subsidiary.
108. Treas. Reg. § 1.382(b)-1(a)(6), T.D. 6616, 1962-2 Cum. BULL. 98.
109. A result similar to that attempted in liquidation-reincorporations is discussed infra
at pp. 78-81.
110. 95 F.2d 732 (4th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 605 (1938).
111. Now INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 355, which provides, generally, that no gain or
loss will be recognized to a shareholder who receives, with respect to his stock, stock of an-
other corporation which is, immediately prior to receipt, controlled by the distributing cor-
poration, and has been engaged (as has the distributing corporation) in an active trade or
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upon completed its exchange of the remaining 20 percent of its assets for
stock of the "purchasing" corporation, in a transaction it believed quali-
fied as a tax-free "C" reorganization since it received stock for "sub-
stantially all" of its remaining assets. In what appears to be a correct
analysis of the ultimate results, the court found that the corporation
actually engaged in a taxable sale of 20 percent of its assets since the
assets retained in the new corporation resulted in disqualifying the
transaction as an exchange of stock for substantially all of the corpora-
tion's assets. In other words, the court would not separate the incorpora-
tion transfer from the reorganization transfer so that, in reality, only a
small portion of the company's assets were exchanged for stock.
Still another aspect of the step-transaction-spin-off relationship
involves a case where the unwanted assets are spun-off to shareholders
who, pursuant to the overall plan, then transfer the remaining assets to
an acquiring corporation in a statutory merger, with the acquiring cor-
poration surviving. It has been held that since the statute requires that
the distributing corporation be engaged in business immediately after
the distribution, the statutory merger has the effect of vitiating the
tax-free nature of the spin-off, and the spin-off distribution thus becomes
a taxable dividend." 2 However, the contrary result has obtained where
the transferor corporation survived the subsequent merger.113
Finally, it should be noted that a mere initial distribution toward
required divestiture of control. 4 of a newly formed subsidiary will not
receive tax-free treatment even though total control is subsequently re-
leased within two years."' The court said that
if an initial transfer of less than a controlling interest in the
controlled corporation is to be treated as a mere first step in the
divestiture of control, it must at least be identifiable as such at
the time it is made."'
Furthermore, although it did not hold that the entire divestiture had
to occur within a single tax year, if one transaction was to be charac-
terized as a first step, there would have to be a "binding commitment to
take the later steps.""1
7
business for the immediate 5-year period, and is engaged (as is the distributing corporation)
in an active trade or business immediately after receipt.
112. Curtis v. United States, 336 F.2d 714 (6th Cir. 1964).
113. Commissioner v. Morris Trust, 367 F.2d 794 (4th Cir. 1966).
114. INT. REV. CoDE of 1954, § 355(a) (1) (D).
115. Commissioner v. Gordon, 391 U.S. 83 (1968).
116. Id. at 96.
117. Id. In Gordon, the court never reached the question of whether a distribution of
rights to acquire stock in the newly formed corporation was sufficient to qualify for tax-free
treatment, but denied tax-free treatment under § 355 for failure to meet the technical re-
quirements of that section. But in Oscar E. Baan, 51 T.C. No. 105 (Mar. 26, 1969), on
remand from the Gordon case to determine -taxability under § 346(b) or § 354, it was stated
that distribution of rights was not equivalent to the distribution of stock required by § 354
and that § 346(b) was not an operative section allowing, by itself, tax-free treatment for
partial liquidation.
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C. Liquidation-Reincorporations
Nowhere is the step-transaction doctrine more vigorously applied
than in the area of liquidation-reincorporations. This is probably be-
cause taxpayers frequently avail themselves of devices or schemes to
continue in business while withdrawing previous earnings at capital
gains rates, obtaining the benefits of capital losses, and/or achieving a
stepped-up basis in property for depreciation purposes.
Prior to 1954, the Service could fight such schemes fairly success-
fully by employment of the then existing "D" reorganization provision,
which simply required a
transfer by a corporation of all or a part of its assets to another
corporation if immediately after the transfer the transferor or
its shareholders or both are in control of the corporation to
which the assets are transferred."8
Under the 1954 Code,119 the transferor corporation must, following
such transfer, either meet the rigid requirements of section 355 or dis-
tribute to its shareholders all of the stock, securities, and other properties
of the transferee corporation to which has been transferred "substantially
all of the assets of the transferor ....
A liquidation-reincorporation setting usually involves a variation
on one of three themes: (1) transfer of assets of one corporation to an-
other corporation controlled by the shareholders of the transferor cor-
poration, followed by liquidation of such transferor corporation; (2)
liquidation of a corporation, followed by the transfer of the liquidated
assets to a new corporation; (3) sale of corporate assets by one corpora-
tion (frequently under provisions of section 337) 121 to another corpo-
ration controlled by the same shareholders, followed by liquidation of
the selling corporation.
Under the 1939 Code, as in all cases since the enactment of the
Revenue Act of 1913,122 the Service was in many instances unsuccessful
in attacking tax avoidance schemes. Thus, it was held in United States v.
Arcade Co.123 that when a liquidation occurred with no plan, or only a
faint hope, of forming a new corporation, a subsequent transfer to a new
corporation of the assets will not be integrated to find a reorganization.
On the other hand, where a corporation was liquidated and the assets
transferred to a new corporation for stock, and notes were used to satisfy
the personal obligations of the shareholders, a capital loss was claimed
118. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, Ch. 1, § 112(g)(1)(D), 53 Stat. 40.
119. INT. REV. COO of 1954, § 368(a) (1) (D).
120. Id. § 354(b) (1).
121. Id. § 337 provides, generally, that no gain or loss will be recognized to a corpora-
tion from the sale of its property if the corporation adopts a plan of liquidation before the
sale, and liquidates within twelve months after adoption of the plan.
122. Act of Oct. 3, 1913, Ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114.
123. 203 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1953).
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on the liquidation and a stepped-up basis was asserted for the assets
transferred to the new- corporation, the court had no difficulty in finding
such an obvious contrivance of steps to be a "D" reorganization, even
without a written plan to interpret the intention.'24
This is not to say that tax savings as a motive will "kill" the deal.
In the Arcade case, the stockholders liquidated on advice of their tax
advisor to obtain a stepped-up basis for depreciation. Obviously the
stockholders intended a reincorporation, but they did not record such
intention and, the key point: each stockholder was carefully notified
that he was free not to participate in the new corporation.' Holdings
such as these were based substantially on the fact that there was no
contractual obligation to form a new corporation. They represent a fading
minority, however, and were not well-received even under the 1939
Code.12
At the time the 1954 Code was enacted, Congress was aware of the
litigation in the area of liquidation-reincorporation and proposed a statu-
tory measure, (section 357), which would have prevented capital gains
treatment and stepped-up basis when a liquidation was followed by a
reincorporation and the shareholders of the liquidated corporation ob-
tained a 50-percent interest in the new corporation. 27 However, the Con-
ference Committee rejected this proposal in the belief that the problem
could be sufficiently handled outside the statutory provisions. 28
With the enactment of section 368(a)(1)(D), and the consequent
blunting of "an instrument highly useful in attacking 'reincorpora-
tions,' ,129 the Service adopted certain regulations1 . to provide that a
liquidation preceded or followed by a transfer of all or a portion of the
liquidating corporation's assets to another corporation may have the effect
of a taxable dividend, 181 or be subject to the "boot" treatment of section
356.182 In addition, the Service issued a ruling'" to the effect that a sale
under section 337 by one corporation of substantially all of its assets to
another corporation for 45 percent of the purchasing corporation's stock,
124. Survaunt v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 753 (8th Cir. 1947) ; accord, Walter S. Heller,
2 T.C. 371 (1943), aff'd, 147 F.2d 376 (9th Cir. 1945).
125. See also Henricksen v. Braicks, 137 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1943).
126. Liddon v. Commissioner, 230 F.2d 304 (6th Cir. 1956); Bard-Parker Co. v. Com-
missioner, 218 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 906 (1955).
127. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong. 2d Sess. A129-30 (1954).
128. H.R. CoNS'. REP. No. 2543, 83d Cong. 2d Sess. 41 (1954).
129. Pridemark, Inc. v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 35, 40 (4th Cir. 1965).
130. Treas. Reg. § 1.331-1(c) (1955).
131. INT. REv. CODE OP 1954, § 301. See Bazely v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 737 (1947).
132. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 356 provides, generally, that if tax-free treatment would
otherwise be accorded a reorganization transaction but for the receipt of property other than
stock or securities permitted to be received, gain will be recognized, not to exceed the fair
market value of the other property. Such gain, if it has the effect of a dividend, will be taxed
as such to the extent of the recipient's ratable share of earnings and profits of the distrib-
uting corporation. The balance of the gain, if any, will receive capital gain treatment.
133. Rev. Rul. 61-156, 1961-2 Cum. BULL. 62.
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long term notes, and cash, followed by liquidation of the selling corpora-
tion, would yield neither capital gain on the liquidating distribution nor
stepped-up basis in the assets "sold." The Service felt that there was no
reality to the sale or to the liquidation, since each transaction was only
a formal step in a reorganization of the "selling" corporation. In essence,
the transaction was merely a recapitalization' and a mere change in
identity, form, or place of organization," 5 and the distribution was
taxable in full as a dividend. That the new corporation, following the
sale, issued 55 percent of its stock to other parties was not relevant, since
it was held to be a separate transaction.
In Joseph C. Gallagher,"' this Revenue Ruling received its test.
Here, in the formation of New Corporation (followed by the sale of Old
Corporation's assets to New Corporation), unrelated new shareholders
acquired a 27 percent interest. The Service argued that formal liquida-
tion of Old Corporation should be ignored since there was, in fact, a re-
incorporation." 7 The court held that all of the steps had to be considered
together, and in so doing it could not find the 80-percent control required
of a "D" reorganization." 8 Further, the court held that an "E" reorgani-
zation did not occur because more than one corporation was involved,
and an "F" reorganization was not present because the transaction went
beyond a "mere change in identity, form, or place of organization.""' 9
Since there was no reorganization, the liquidating distribution could not be
taxed as a dividend or under the "boot" provisions of section 356.14°
A "D" reorganization was again avoided by a taxpayer when he
sold, under section 337, one-half the operating assets of his old corpora-
tion to a new corporation, 50 percent owned by his former employee. 4'
Illustrative of the fact that one cannot be assured of avoiding a "D"
reorganization and its "boot" or dividend treatment by mere non-com-
pliance with certain technicalities of the statute is the case of David T.
Grubbs.4' Here it was demonstrated that the overall substance of the
transaction will still be reviewed by the courts. So, though the "D"
reorganization as an instrument to attack reincorporations is "blunted,"
it is not useless. In David T. Grubbs, the steps leading from one corpora-
tion to two, with the second owned by the same shareholders as the first,
134. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 368(a) (1) (E).
135. Id. § 368(a) (1) (F).
136. 39 T.C. 144 (1962).
137. Id. at 158.
138. Id. at 161.
139. Id. at 162.
140. Id. at 162-63.
141. Commissioner v. Berghash, 361 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1966). Accord, Drummond v.
United States, 68-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9608 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
142. 39 T.C. 42 (1962) (the first judicial test of a liquidation-reincorporation under
the 1954 Code).
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and the first owned by only one of the original shareholders (the others
having received cash for their ownership), were found to be part of an
overall "D" reorganization, so that the cash received was "boot. 1 43
Despite certain continued victories by the Service with the "D"
reorganization, its major weakness appears obvious: if new shareholders
in excess of 20 percent of the stock are admitted to the new corporation,
it cannot meet the test.144 This may even be the result if the new share-
holders are related parties, such as family members. Therefore, the Ser-
vice has been seeking new tools to deny the tax avoidance possibilities.
Basically, it has been attempting to achieve a broader interpretation of
the "F" reorganization as it relates to single corporations. And, on one
occasion, it argued for the "F" reorganization in a case involving two
corporations,' 45 but abandoned its argument on appeal." 6 The problem
represents somewhat of a dilemma for the Service, since if it does not
contend for an "F" reorganization in multi-corporate reincorporations
it will lose still more force in its fight in this area. If it does contend for
such a result, however, it will be agreeing to the ability of a new corpora-
tion to carry back net operating losses to the old, predecessor corporations,
a result not possible under any other reorganization provision. To date,
there is an apparent split in the courts as to the breadth of an "F"
reorganization, with the ninth circuit 14 7 and the fifth circuit 14 8 holding
an "F" reorganization possible with multi-corporate transactions, and the
fourth circuit'49 and the Tax Court' 50 holding that an "F" reorganiza-
tion is not available except in the restructuring of a single corporation.
The Service has entered an extensive non-acquiescence and explanation
for why it will not follow those cases holding that a multi-corporate "F"
reorganization is possible. 15'
143. Accord, Davant v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 1022 (1967) ; Reef Corp. v. Commissioner, 368 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 1018 (1967); Ralph Wilson, 46 T.C. 334 (1966); James Armour, Inc., 43 T.C.
295 (1964).
144. Commissioner v. Berghash, 361 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1966); Joseph C. Gallagher, 39
T.C. 144 (1962). See Simon Trust v. United States, 402 F.2d 272 (Ct. Cl. 1968), where
failure to have a plan of reorganization or transfer "substantially all of its assets" pursuant
to Section 354 resulted in a finding of no "D" reorganization.
145. South Texas Rice Warehouse Co., 43 T.C. 540 (1965), aff'd sub noma. Davant v.
Commissioner, 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1022 (1967).
146. Davant v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1022
(1967).
147. Associated Mach. v. Commissioner, 403 F.2d 622 (9th Cir. 1968); Estate of
Stauffer v. Commissioner, 403 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1968).
148. Davant v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1022
(1967); Reef Corp. v. Commissioner, 368 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
1018 (1967).
149. Pridemark, Inc. v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1965).
150. Associated Mach., 48 T.C. 318 (1967), rev'd, 403 F.2d 622 (9th Cir. 1968) ; Estate
of Bernard H. Stauffer, 48 T.C. 277 (1967), rev'd, 403 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1968).
151. Rev. Rul. 69-185, 1969 INT. REV. BULL. No. 16, at 11.
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D. Like Kind Exchanges
1. GENERALLY
In the area of like kind exchanges' 52 the step-transaction doctrine
must often be called upon to reveal the reality of an overall business
scheme. Generally the question to be answered is whether there has, in
fact, been a single reciprocal exchange or two (or more) separate trans-
actions. At stake, sometimes, is a stepped-up basis for investment
credit' and/or depreciation purposes, the cost of which basis is pay-
ment of a capital gains tax, subject to the depreciation recapture pro-
visions'54 and possible investment credit recapture.' 55 Again, the benefit
to be derived by a segregation of transactions may be the deductibility
of a loss.156
2. SALES AND LEASEBACKS
In sale and leaseback cases, the point attacked is often a taxpayer's
attempt to deduct a loss on the disposition of property used in his trade
or business' 57 while not, at least materially, altering his immediate eco-
nomic position with respect to such property. The Service has exercised
its power' 58 in this area by adopting regulations' 59 which exemplify non-
recognition of gain or loss when certain like kind 6 ° property is exchanged.
Despite the existence of these regulations,' 6 ' neither the taxpayers nor
the Service have high regard for that provision in the regulations which
holds that the "exchange" of a fee simple interest for a leasehold having
at least 30 years to run is the exchange of like kind property.
Thus, in cases where the taxpayer has sold his property in a trans-
action providing for a leaseback for periods of more than 20 years but
less than 30 years, the Service has attacked the loss taken on the grounds
that the taxpayers did not intend to, nor did they, part with any sub-
stantial interest in the property sold.' 62 However, in these cases the
152. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1031 provides, generally, that no gain or loss will be
recognized if the property used in a trade or business or for investment purposes (not in-
cluding inventory, or stocks, bonds, accounts receivable, etc.) is exchanged solely for "like
kind" property to be held for investment or use in a trade or business.
153. See id. § 46(c).
154. Id. §§ 1245, 1250.
155. Id. § 47.
156. On the other hand, if a company has a net operating loss about to expire, it is
possible that a timely gain would be desired.
157. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 165, 1231.
158. Id. § 7805 empowers the Secretary of the Treasury (who delegates such power to
the Service) to "prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement of" the In-
ternal Revenue Code.
159. Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-1(c) (1956).
160. "Like kind" has reference to the nature or character of the property, not its grade
or quality. Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-l(b) (1956).
161. The regulations were also present under the 1939 Internal Revenue Code. Treas.
Reg. § 29.112(b)(1)-i (1943).
162. May Dep't Stores Co., 16 T.C. 547 (1951); Standard Envelope Mfg. Co., 15
T.C. 41 (1950).
COMMENTS
court has held that the difference between a fee simple ownership and
a mere leasehold is sufficient to retain separateness of the sale and the
leaseback aspects of the transaction.
In more recent decisions there have been conflicting opinions in
similar fact patterns involving sale and leaseback transactions, where the
leasehold was at least the 30-year term prescribed by the regulations to
accord like kind treatment. In the first of these cases, the corporate tax-
payer unsuspectingly compromised itself when, in an effort to raise funds
by selling its property, obtaining a deductible loss on the sale, and re-
taining substantial control by virtue of a 95-year leaseback, it unhappily
found that the court countenanced the like kind regulations dealing with
30-year leaseholds and disallowed the loss.6 3 In so doing, the court also
recognized that the taxpayer no longer had an interest in the depreciable
properties, and instead of permitting depreciation of the unallowed loss
over the remaining life of such properties, required the adjusted basis of
the leasehold to be amortized over the 95-year term of the lease.
The court, in supporting the regulations on the basis of the re-enact-
ment doctrine,' may have been somewhat overzealous-there had never
been occasion to consider the regulation in a prior case, and in those cases
mentioned above the court definitely recognized a difference in the nature
or character of a fee simple as opposed to a leasehold. Congress may have
considered this fact sufficiently dispositive to preclude the necessity for
legislative enactment.
In Jordan Marsh Co. v. Commissioner,'65 the court refused to inte-
grate the sale at a loss and leaseback for over 30 years of the same
building. Here, the court stated that if integration of the transactions
was required so that there was an exchange rather than a sale and a
leaseback, it would still be necessary to determine the validity of the
regulations as to whether a 30-year leasehold was property "like" a fee
simple absolute. 66
Because the court viewed the legislative history of this non-recogni-
tion section of the Code as evidencing an intent to refuse to tax transac-
tions where there is a mere change in the form of ownership rather than
a change in substance, it concluded that the section could not be applica-
ble in this case. This was because there was, in fact, a change in the
quantum of ownership whereby the taxpayer had "closed out a losing
venture,' 67 thus liquidating its property interest for cash in an amount
163. Century Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 954 (1952).
164. The re-enactment doctrine basically stands for the proposition that where a regu-
lation has been in force for many years and successive re-enactments of the Internal Rev-
enue Acts have not modified it, it acquires the force of law. Helvering v. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., 306 U.S. 110 (1939); Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Tomlinson, 399 F.2d 652, 656-57 (5th
Cir. 1968).
165. 269 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1959).
166. Id. at 455.
167. Id. at 457.
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equal to the value of the fee. Therefore an exchange rather than a sale
was found, 68 and the court did not specifically rule on the validity of the
regulations.'69
3. EQUALITY OF TREATMENT
Both parties do not necessarily have to be treated equally in a sec-
tion 1031 transaction. 7 ° With respect to the regulations discussed above,
however, which were probably designed to integrate transactions cast to
avoid taxation on the true transaction, if the Service believes that ex-
change of a fee simple for a 30-year leasehold is a like-kind exchange,
then a fortiori exchange of the leasehold should be given like kind tax
treatment. However, the Service has said that:
' ' * [w]hile the transfer of real property in considera-
tion of the execution of a leasehold interest in the same or other
property may be an exchange of properties of like kind for pur-
poses of Section 1031 of the Code to the transferor-lessee, it is
not an exchange of properties of like kind by the transferee-
lessor.1 7
1
It would appear that if the result is increased revenue for the
Treasury, in some circumstances the theory of integrating transactions
would only be half-heartedly applied. Obviously this situation is im-
proper. Consideration of revenue-raising should not be at issue in draft-
ing regulations, promulgating rules or guidelines, or rendering judicial
decisions. Such a consideration is solely within the discretion of the
Congress and should be exercised by the setting of tax rates. The only
discussion on a statute should deal with its equitable application. Natur-
ally the Service and the courts will continue to be called on for inter-
pretive functions, but it is submitted that their attention should be
focused on the substance of the transaction, keeping in mind the relation-
ship of the parties and the governing statute; the effect on the revenue
should be left to Congress.
4. TRADE-IN PROBLEMS
Aside from exchanges (or sales and leasebacks collapsed into ex-
changes) of unlike property which by regulatory fiat has been defined
168. The Service non-acquiesced, taking the position that the transaction was an ex-
change of like kind property, with cash received as "boot." Rev. Rul. 60-43, 1960-1 CuM.
BULL. 687.
169. The language of the court, however, strongly indicates that a leasehold is not like
kind property vis-h-vis a fee simple. This can be inferred from the court's reference to the
quantum of an estate and to the lesser interest evidenced by.a leasehold. 269 F.2d at 456.
170. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1031(a), specifically provides that tax-free treatment
does not apply to an exchange of stock in trade or property held primarily for sale. Thus,
one person trading property used in his business may be accorded the benefits of § 1031
while the dealer in the exchange will not, since he is trading with his stock in trade (in-
ventory).
171. Rev. Rul. 66-209, 1966-2 Cum. BuLL. 299, 300. See also Andrew J. Pembroke,
23 B.T.A. 1176 (1931), aff'd, 70 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir. 1934).
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as like kind property, another major like kind exchange area of contro-
versy is the situation in which the taxpayer attempts to get a stepped-up
basis in newly acquired property while giving up similar property used
in his trade or business or for investment. 172 Where there is a sale of the
old property to a different person than the one from whom the new
property is acquired, the Service will apparently not succeed in inte-
grating the transaction into a mere exchange.'73 But in a case where two
parties-a buyer and a seller-deal together in such a manner as to
formally effect a sale (often at a loss, but sometimes at a gain) by one
party of his old property, and a subsequent purchase by the same party
of new property, the separate steps taken will be integrated into a single
exchange subject to obligatory non-recognition of gain or loss 74 and a
"carryover" basis' 75 because the "sale and purchase are reciprocal and
mutually dependent transactions . . . even though . . . accomplished
by separately executed contracts and . . . treated as unrelated trans-
actions .... 2 16
Although most of the cases dealing with this problem have had con-
current or proximate transactions which made it easier to disregard the
formalistic steps, it would seem that as long as the elements of reciprocity
and dependency, in the sense of creating a non-severable transactional
relationship between the two parties, are present, "a tax-free exchange
cannot be transformed into two sales by the arbitrary separation of time
and exchange of cash."' 77 As the court has said, in disregarding the
separated steps which only looked like independent transactions,
[t]axation is transactional and not cuneiform. Our tax laws
are not so supple that scraps of paper, regardless of their callig-
raphy, can transmute trade-ins into sales. Although [the tax-
payer's] transfer may have been paper sales, they were actual
exchanges. A taxpayer may engineer his transactions to mini-
mize taxes, but he cannot make a transaction appear to be
what it is not. Documents record transactions, but they do not
always become the sole criteria for transactional analysis.'
5. THREE-CORNERED EXCHANGES
If a taxpayer has property which is used in his business or otherwise
qualifies under section 1031, and another party desires to acquire it, an
outright sale would be a taxable transaction. To avoid this, the taxpayer
172. Commissioner v. North Shore Bus. Co., 143 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1944); National
Outdoor Advertising Bureau v. Helvering, 89 F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1937) ; Joseph J. Vidmar, 11
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 854 (1952); Groves, Cox & Co., 27 B.T.A. 546 (1933); Rev. Rul. 61-
119, 1961-1 CuM. BuLL. 395.
173. See Carlton v. United States, 385 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1967).
174. INT. REV. CODE: of 1954, § 1031(a).
175. Id. § 1031(d).
176. Rev. Rul. 61-119, 1961-1 CuM. BULL. 395, 397.
177. Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Tomlinson, 399 F.2d 652, 658 (5th Cir. 1968).
178. Id. at 659.
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may require the purchaser to first acquire like-kind property suitable to
the taxpayer and then enter into a tax-free exchange under section
103 1.' Although the ultimate transaction between the taxpayer and the
purchaser may appear to satisfy the statutory requirements for tax-free
treatment, the Service is wary of disregarding the fact that the purchaser
did not own, at the outset of negotiations, the property which he ex-
changes. 8' In other words, transactions entered into by a purchaser in
an effort to secure the property desired by the taxpayer may be treated
separately, similar to an agency arrangement whereby there has been or
will be a sale and the "agent" is merely finding property for the purpose
of replacement.' 8 '
The courts have been fairly generous in finding a non-taxable ex-
change even where the taxpayer has searched for the replacement prop-
erty, where the person with whom the taxpayer trades acquires the
property and the form of conveyancing follows the path of the intended
exchange.8 2 On the other hand, where it was possible to separate the
transactions, such as where the formalism of deeding the property did
not follow the trade-in intended, 8 ' or the taxpayer, despite his intention,
was at least conceptually free to take purchase money without acquiring
or having acquired the property for exchange,84 or where there was a
transaction which provided the parties the desired result but the timing
was such that it could be held that they did not exchange property with
each other,'85 taxability has been sustained.
In Carlton v. United States,'8 6 it was stipulated that the parties in-
tended to effect a tax-free exchange. But instead of having the property
desired by the taxpayer acquired by the exchanging party, the parties,
in order to avoid the problem of multiple deeding, simply held a closing
at which time cash and the right to acquire the replacement property
179. W. D. Haden Co. v. Commissioner, 165 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1948).
180. Bureau of Nat'l Affairs, Tax Free Exchanges Under Section 1031, 61 TAx MAN-
AGEMENT PORTFOLIOS 7 (1963).
181. Sale of property and the purchase of similar property does not constitute an ex-
change. Trenton Cotton Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 33 (6th Cir. 1945).
182. Alderson v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1963); Coastal Terminals, Inc.
v. United States, 320 F.2d 333 (4th Cir. 1963) ; Mercantile Trust Co., 32 B.T.A. 82 (1935).
183. Carlton v. United States, 385 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1967).
184. Id.; Halpern v. United States, 286 F. Supp. 255 (N.D. Ga. 1968). In Halpern,
where the taxpayer received "boot" in a like kind exchange and, pursuant to his intention
at the outset, used such "boot" to acquire additional like kind properties from other parties,
such additional properties did not qualify under § 1031 as integral parts of the original
transaction, because acquisition of the additional properties did not depend on the initial
transfer.
185. John M. Rogers, 44 T.C. 126 (1965). In this case, there was no § 1031 exchange
where, prior to sale of the property pursuant to an option agreement, the taxpayer at-
tempted an exchange of his property subject to the option with a third party for like kind
property. The purchaser exercised his option before the third party acquired title in the tax-
payer's property. Hence it was determined that the taxpayer did not receive property, in
exchange from the purchaser, and that -the third party did not receive property in exchange
from the taxpayer.
186. 385 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1967).
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were paid to the taxpayer for his property. Even though the taxpayer did,
in fact, complete the transaction intended, the court held that the receipt
of cash "was unrestricted and could be used by the appellants as they
pleased."'1 87 The court felt that the established rule of Kanawha Gas
& Utilities Co. v. Commissioner,'88 to the effect that the incidence of
taxation is to be determined by viewing an entire transaction as a whole,
did not "permit [it] to close [its] eyes to the realities of the transaction
and merely look at the beginning and end of a transaction without
observing the steps taken to reach that end."' 89 The court also noted that
the taxpayer had been active in negotiating for the acquisition of the
replacement property.
From the Carlton, Halpern and Rogers cases 9 ° it would appear that
a person desiring a tax-free exchange in a three-cornered transaction
should avoid participating in the negotiations for any replacement prop-
erty and assure that the form of the transaction complies precisely with
all of the elements of the exchange intended, including acquisition by the
other party of the property being exchanged and direct exchange with
such other party only, with the transfers of title following the necessary
legal ownership of the property.
E. Kimbell-Diamond Rule
1. GENERALLY
It is possible for a corporation to acquire assets of another corpora-
tion without cash outlay and receive a substantial stepped-up basis for
depreciation purposes. This something-for-nothing proposition might be
accomplished by a finding that (1) the Kimbell-Diamond rule'9' is still
viable; (2) a "purchase' ' 9 2 includes an exchange of stock of the buyer
for stock of the seller in at least two transactions spanning a period longer
than 12 months'93 where there is no legal commitment on the part of the
seller to exchange his stock in the transactions following the first ex-
change; 9 ' and (3) a stock-for-stock reorganization' 95 is effective only if
a series of stock exchanges exceeding 12 months are made pursuant to
a continuous offer to acquire the stock. 19
187. Id. at 243.
188. 214 F.2d 685 (5th Cir. 1954).
189. 385 F.2d 238, 241 (5th Cir. 1967) (emphasis added).
190. Cases cited notes 184, 185 supra.
191. Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co., 14 T.C. 74 (1950), aff'd per curiam, 187 F.2d 718
(5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 827 (1952) ; discussed infra at 88.
192. See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 334(b)(3).
193. Id. § 334(b) (2) (B).
194. See Commissioner v. Gordon, 391 U.S. 83 (1968).
195. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 368(a) (1) (B).
196. American Potash & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 402 F.2d 1000 (Ct. C1. 1968).
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2. CORPORATE APPLICATION
To understand the above result, it is necessary to discuss what may
be the classic example of a step transaction. This is the situation where
some person wants to acquire assets of a corporation, but the selling
corporation wants to sell stock (usually because it is a cleaner "break"
with the entity and all problems of liquidation are avoided). To accom-
plish this objective, the purchaser acquires the stock and then liqui-
dates the corporation, thus ending up with the desired assets. This
series of transactions is commonly referred to as a Kimbell-Diamond
transaction, taking its name from the Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co.
case."' This pre-1954 case involved facts substantially as set out above.
The taxpayer had suffered a fire which destroyed its mill plant, and in
order to get back into business it had to acquire the stock of an existing
corporation. It bought the stock on December 26, 1942, and liquidated
the corporation on December 29, 1942. In so doing it claimed that the
purchase of stock and the liquidation were two separate transactions
resulting in a receipt of the assets with the same basis as in the hands of
the subsidiary. 98 The Service argued that, notwithstanding that there
was no binding commitment to liquidate, the real substance of the trans-
action was an acquisition of assets so that basis must be determined by
reference to the cost of the stock, i.e., the liquidation step was to be dis-
regarded. In holding for the Service, the court relied on the substance
of the transaction argument, as articulated in Commissioner v. Court
Holding Co.'99 The facts were found to support a holding that the tax-
payer's purpose in acquiring the stock was to obtain the assets. Conse-
quently, the basis of the assets was reduced and a deficiency collected,
primarily due to the corresponding depreciation deduction.
The Kimbell-Diamond rule was pronounced earlier in Commissioner
v. Ashland Oil & Refining Co.,' where the court said that "transitory
ownership of stock is not necessarily of legal significance." '' Here, again,
the evidence was substantial that the intent of the taxpayer was to ac-
quire property rather than stock. The court, accordingly, refused to
recognize the series of intervening transactions between payment and
possession of such properties.
And without regard to whether the result is imposition or
relief from taxation, the courts [will recognize] that where the
essential nature of a transaction is the acquisition of property,
197. 14 T.C. 74 (1950), aff'd per curiam, 187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 827 (1952).
198. Under provisions of predecessor statutes to today's sections 332 and 334 of the
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE of 1954.
199. 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
200. 99 F.2d 588 (6th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 661 (1939); accord, Koppers
Coal Co., 6 T.C. 1209 (1946).
201. 99 F.2d 588, 591 (6th Cir. 1938).
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it will be viewed as a whole, and closely related steps will not
be separated either at the instance of the taxpayer or the taxing
authority. s20
This enlightened approach to reality is such that it seems incredible
that Congress waited as long as it did to legislate in the area to prevent
such disputes as arose in Kimbell-Diamond. In 1954, however, section
334(b)(2) was added to the Internal Revenue Code for the apparent
purpose of incorporating a mechanical test for cases like these, regardless
of the intent factor which was critical in the pre-1954 cases. °3 Under
this section, the assets acquired in liquidation will take a basis equal
to the purchase price of the stock (with certain modifications occasioned
by time delays) if 80 percent of the stock is acquired by a corporation by
purchase within 12 months and a plan of liquidation is adopted within
two years after the date of the qualifying purchase resulting in control.0 4
The provisions of this section are mandatory, so that if a corpora-
tion wanted to avoid the effects, for example to obtain a tax attribute
such as a net operating loss carryover 20 5 rather then a stepped-up basis, it
would have to plan for the transaction to fall outside the statutory frame-
work.
The question was left open as to whether such planned avoidance
would be effective or whether Congress meant to and/or did effectively
statutorily overrule the Kimbell-Diamond rule.208
In American Potash & Chemical Corp. v. United States2 °7 the par-
ties stipulated for purposes of the Service's motion for summary judg-
ment that the taxpayer really exercised a series of steps for the purpose
of obtaining the assets of an acquired corporation. The steps were: (1)
acquisition of 48 percent of the acquired company's stock solely for vot-
ing stock of taxpayer; (2) 14 months later, in another stock-for-stock
exchange, acquisition of the remaining 52 percent of the acquired com-
202. Id.
203. See Rev. Rul. 60-262, 1960-2 Cum. BuLL.. 114, 115, where it is said that within
the framework of Section 334(b) (2) "the formal steps themselves are significant under the
1954 Code and the element of purpose or intent is immaterial." Therefore, even where the
admitted purpose was to acquire stock of a going business rather than its assets, later com-
pliance with the elements of § 334(b) (2) resulted in a stepped-up basis. Id.
204. Note that it would seem that the liquidation can, by virtue of the procedures
set out in § 332(b), to which § 334(b)(2) is related, be delayed at least until five years
after purchase, and possibly even longer; but the longer the delay in liquidating, the more
likely it is that some judicial doctrine will be raised to find non-compliance with § 334(b) (2).
See J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INcomE TAXATION, § 334(b)(2):5 (1968).
205. But see INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 269, 382 as to certain statutory limitations
on acquiring favorable tax attributes, and Libson Shops, Inc. v. Koehler, 353 U.S. 382
(1957), as to certain judicial limitations.
206. E.g., B. BITrrER & J. EUSTICE, supra note 11, at 378; J. CHOmMIE, supra note 11,
at 447-48; Cohen, Gelberg, Surrey, Tarlean, & Warren, Corporate Liquidations Under the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 55 CoLuM. L. REv. 37 (1955); Mansfield, The Kimbell-
Diamond Situation: Basis to the Purchaser in Connection with Liquidation, N.Y.U. 13TH
INST. ON FED. TAx. 623 (1955).
207. 399 F.2d 194 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
1969]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXIV
pany's stock (It was admitted that if the remaining 52 percent of the
stock could not be acquired, the taxpayer would have sold the stock
acquired earlier.); and (3) seven months thereafter, liquidation of the
acquired company.
Because the purpose of the taxpayer was to acquire assets, it treated
the transaction as a purchase of such assets, thus ignoring the stock
exchanges and liquidation, and taking an increased basis in the assets by
reference to the fair market value of its stock exchanged,"0 8 liabilities
assumed, and certain advances made during the seven-month parent-
subsidiary relationship. Here the reverse of the Kimbell-Diamond Milling
Co. case was acted out by the parties. The Service contended there was
no purchase of assets, so that basis carried over to the parent company
liquidating its subsidiary; i.e., section 334(b) (2) statutorily overruled
the Kimbell-Diamond rule and the company, if it falls outside the pro-
vision, must take a carry-over basis in assets. In asserting its position,
the Service advanced these alternative arguments: (1) that the series of
steps taken by the taxpayer should be disregarded and the substance,
viz., an exchange of stock for assets ("C" reorganization), should be
recognized so that a carryover basis would apply;2"9 (2) that the com-
pany was merely liquidating a subsidiary under section 332 and 334(b)
(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, so that a carryover basis
would apply.
The court found that a "C" reorganization was impossible, since
this requires an exchange of voting stock for substantially all of the assets
of the transferor (selling) corporation.2 10 The court was considerably
bothered by the Service's attempt to collapse the stock-for-stock trans-
actions into a stock-for-assets transaction even though the parties agreed
that it was the assets which the taxpayer was trying to get. It labored over
the prospects of converting an "unqualified B-type exchange and a subse-
quent liquidation ' 12 1 into a "C" reorganization. It feared that because
of the "creeping acquisition" for stock, if a "C" reorganization were
found it would be an approval of a seriatim acquisition of assets.
It should be noted that the Service did not assert that there was a
"B" reorganization, but the court, sua sponte, found that because the
12-month period referred to in the regulations in relation to a "B" re-
organization had been exceeded, there was, in fact, no valid "B" reorgan-
ization. 21 2
208. See Nassau Lens Co. v. Commissioner, 308 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1962); Moore-McCor-
mack Lines, Inc., 44 T.C. 745 (1965).
209. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 362(b).
210. See text accompanying notes 94 through 104, supra.
211. 399 F.2d at 201 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
212. On a later rehearing pursuant to defendant's Petition for Reconsideration, the
Service did assert that a valid "B" reorganization occurred and that the 12-month rule was
merely suggestive, not mandatory. The court remanded this issue along with the other issue
to determine whether the facts indicated that there was a continuing offer for all of the
stock from the first acquisition, a requirement the court felt necessary to extend a "creeping
acquisition" "B" reorganization beyond the 12-month period. 402 F.2d 1000 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
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There being no valid "B" reorganization, there could be no carry-
over basis on liquidation under section 362(b) of the Code l.21  This
followed, said the court, because the precise requirements of the statute
to form a "C" reorganization had not been met.
2 14
Here the transaction was stock-for-stock, not stock-for-assets as re-
quired by section 368(a) (1) (C). If the substance were viewed as stock-
for-assets, it would not be for substantially all of the assets in exchange,
since it was a "creeping acquisition" transaction. 15
Having determined a carryover basis was not possible vis-a-vis
liquidation of a subsidiary acquired in a reorganization, the court then
addressed itself to the Service's alternative argument that the steps in-
volved in the ultimate obtaining of the assets must 'take a carryover
basis, on the ground that section 334(b) (2) preempted the step-transaction
approach of the Kimbell-Diamond rule and left a corporation acquiring
stock outside the perimeter of that section with no basis alternative on
liquidation other than the carryover basis of section 334(b) (1). It held
that the purpose of section 334(b)(2) was to establish a degree of cer-
tainty in the area of parent-subsidiary liquidations, but that it was not
intended to eliminate a corporation's option under the Kimbell-Diamond
rule to obtain a cost basis for assets if it was intended to acquire such
assets, rather than stock. 1 If a corporation intends to acquire assets,
therefore, it need not have the benefits of section 334(b) (2)17 in order
to get a stepped-up basis, but to achieve certainty in getting what it
wants, it would be wise to plan to come within the statutory provisions.
Conversely, if it is intended not to acquire assets with a stepped-up basis,
such intention must, in fact and form, be properly evidenced.
Whether it is a fair construction of Congressional intent to hold that
it did not desire the taxpayer to have any options is still open to some
213. See text accompanying notes 106 through 108, supra.
214. The court based its conclusion, in large part, on the regulations:
In order to exclude transactions not intended to be included, the specifications of
the reorganization provisions of the law are precise. Both the terms of the
specifications and the underlying assumptions and purposes must be satisfied in
order to entitle the taxpayer to the benefit of the exception from the general rule
[that a gain or loss must be recognized on the exchange].
Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1(b) (1955).
215. The question arises: why couldn't the court combine the argument- of substance
versus form with the step transaction doctrine (which is subsumed by the substance versus
form doctrine), thus finding a purchase of 100% of the assets for stock by integrating the
acquisitions? Possibly it is because there was never any certainty that the remaining 52%
could be acquired; in fact, two separate offers for all the stock had to be made during which
time the purchase price offer was raised in order to acquire all of the stock. Perhaps the
court was mindful of the earlier pronouncement in Commissioner v. Gordon, 391 U.S.
83, 96 (1968), that "if one transaction is to be characterized as a 'first step' there must be
a binding commitment to take the later steps." (Emphasis added.)
216. See H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A109 (1954); S. REP. No. 1622,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 256 (1954).
217. The court, in holding Section 334(b)(2) not preclusive, seems to have used fair
logic. There is no reason to believe that judicial doctrine and discretion in an area such as
step transactions are precluded merely because a statute in the same general area has been
enacted. See Brookes, Corporate Liquidations, U. So. CAL. 1960 TAx. INST. 233, 241.
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question.21 At least in the Court Holding219 area it has been held that
such options to taxpayers were intended.220
3. APPLICATION TO INDIVIDUALS
Under the 1939 Code, the Kimbell-Diamond rule had also been
applied in cases where individuals acquired stock to get at underlying
assets.22' In Ruth M. Cullen222 the taxpayer was given a stepped-up
basis in property acquired in liquidation even though he had owned a
25 percent interest in the corporation for twelve years prior to acquiring
the remaining 75 percent. (On the liquidation the taxpayer had taken a
short-term capital loss on the 75 percent to the extent that the price
paid for the stock exceeded the book basis of the assets received.)
The court held that (1) there was a long-term capital gain on the 25
percent interest owned, measured by the difference between the fair
market value of the assets received and the cost of such 25 percent in-
terest, and (2) there was no capital loss with respect to the other 75
percent, but rather the basis in the assets had to be stepped-up to an
amount equal to the cost of the stock.2"
Although by obiter dictum the court in American Potash indicated
that the Kimbell-Diamond rule was still viable with respect to an in-
dividual purchase-liquidation situation, the issue has not been fully tested
under the 1954 Code. In Griswold v. Commissioner,224 the court did not
actually reach the issue of whether the Kimbell-Diamond rule should be
applied, because the external evidence that there was no intent to acquire
the assets was such that a discussion of the steps taken to acquire the
assets would have been pointless. The implication of the case, however,
218. One argument, that Congress may have intended the taxpayer to plan the avoid-
ance of Section 334(b)(2), can be found in the Senate Report.
"[P]rovided the conditions of [§ 334(b)(2)] are met, the basis of the property in the
hands of the distributee shall be the adjusted basis of the stock . .. ."
S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 257 (1954) (emphasis added).
219. Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
220. Milwaukee Sanitarium v. United States, 193 F. Supp. 299 (E.D. Wis. 1961). For
another possible area of statutory pre-emption see Myron C. Poole, 46 T.C. 392 (1966),
acquiesed in 1966-2 Cum. BULL. 6, where the court stated that regulations [Treas. Reg.
1.1235-1(b) (1957), which provided that other provisions of the law will be used if the
statute is not applicable due to Section 1235(d)] are not valid if interpreted to mean that
so long as payments are in accordance with Section 1235(a) capital gains will result. The
legislative history indicated that Section 1235 is to be the sole basis for determining
capital gains treatment on transfers of patents. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 441
(1954). 46 T.C. 25 at 404 n.7. But see Lee v. United States, No. 67-C-324 (E.D. Wis. Aug.
6, 1969).
221. H.B. Snively, 19 T.C. 850 (1953), aff'd, 219 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1955); Ruth M.
Cullen, 14 T.C. 368 (1950).
222. 14 T.C. 368 (1950).
223. When § 334(b)(2) was enacted, it was limited to corporate transactions when
the Senate modified the House proposal which would have made the law applicable to
both individuals and corporations. H. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1954); S.
REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 48 (1954).
224. 400 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1968).
COMMENTS
is that the rule is still viable vis-a-vis individual purchasers of stock
since, had the intent factor to acquire assets been evidenced, the court
would presumably have found that there was a "single, integrated trans-
action to acquire the assets of [the company]." '225
However, as argued in American Potash, where the Service asserted
that Congress' enactment of Section 334(b)(2) was an attempt to pro-
vide the sole means of effecting a stepped-up basis in assets acquired
through liquidation of a subsidiary, it has been suggested that this same
statute could arguably have been intended to preclude a Kimbell-Di-
amond result as concerns individuals.2
V. CONCLUSION
There are many other areas where the step-transaction doctrine may
be employed to avoid results not consonant with the substance of the
overall transaction. For example, where a taxpayer pledges or mortgages
property with a low basis and high value for a loan or other consideration
equal to such value, the later foreclosure of the mortgage will trigger
gain just as though there had been merely a sale rather than a non-
intervening loan. 7 And when a taxpayer negotiates a sale of stock to
its subsidiary, and before consummating the sale but after agreement
that the stock would be purchased distributes such stock to its share-
holder (a parent corporation), the transfer will be considered the transfer
of a right to receive income since the taxpayer, in fact, made the sale.2
In this respect it is obvious that judicial doctrine, including the rule laid
down in Commissioner v. Court Holding Co.,229 will be applied when
not covered by a specific statutory alternative.
Another good example of the imposition of step-transaction doctrine
to prevent abuse is illustrated in Revenue Ruling 68-602,22o where it was
held that a parent corporation could not contribute funds to an insolvent
subsidiary in order to bring subsequent liquidation under the provisions
of section 332 to enable a succession of the subsidiary's net operating
loss carryover. The Service said,
[S]ince the step involving the cancellation of the indebted-
ness ... was an integral part of the liquidation and had no in-
dependent significance other than to secure the tax benefits of
. .. [the] net operating loss carryover, such step will be con-
sidered transitory and, therefore, disregarded.231
225. Id. at 431.
226. 3A J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOmE TAXATION § 21.167 (1968).
227. R. O'Dell & Sons Co. v. Commissioner, 169 F.2d 247 (3d Cir. 1948).
228. Waltham Netoco Theatres, Inc., 49 T.C. 399 (1968).
229. 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
230. 1968 INT. REv. BULL. No. 47, at 9.
231. Id. at 10.
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While there appears to be no end to the situations evoking the step-
transaction doctrine, it cannot be seriously suggested that a statutory
framework could solve the problem. Although there may be isolated in-
stances where legislation will prevent (or allow) the obvious,232 the courts
must ultimately determine the correct tax result under the particular
circumstances. In this regard, the courts will disregard mere transitory
steps "where they add nothing of substance to the completed affair.) 223
232. E.g., INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 334(b) (2), 337.
233. Helvering v. Alabama Asphaltic Limestone Co., 315 U.S. 179, 184-85 (1942).
